gn ten years to his reign.[71] During Yadin’s second year of excavations, he began work in what became Area F, which is located in the lower cit

g also that this abundance of IIIA:2 pottery was complemented “with [a] few A: 1” vessels.[76] According to the pottery specialist whom Yadin consulted, Mycenaean IIIA:2 pottery dates to ca. 1400–1375 BC in its early forms and dates to ca. 1375–1300 BC in its late forms, while Mycenaean IIIA:1 ware dates to ca. 1425–1400 BC.[77] In Yadin’s discussion of LB-I-Age pottery found in Hazor’s caves during his expeditions, he describes numerous types of late Mycenaean IIIA:2 wares, but he makes no mention of any early Mycenaean IIIA:2 pottery that would date to the short period from ca. 1400–1375 BC.[78] This dearth of early Mycenaean IIIA:2 pottery matches well with the period of non-habitation—as revealed by the noted occupational gap—that occurred after the city was destroyed on Joshua’s northern campaign in ca. 1400 BC. Thus the cave was in use during the years shortly before ca. 1400 BC, and throughout the years from ca. 1375–1300 BC.The stratified, royal scarab of Thutmose IV cannot be considered a later reproduction or a mere family heirloom that was passed down from one generation to the next. As Yadin carefully explains, “All Thutmose IV scarabs are rare and a boon to archaeologists in this country because we know that they were made exclusively during his reign (the names of some Pharaohs continued to be inscribed on scarabs after their death, but the popularity of Thutmose IV was buried along with him). We can therefore conclude that the cave was first used sometime during his eight-year reign, from 1410 to 1402 BC, or immediately thereafter.”[79] The significance of this royal scarab to the present debate is that it confirms the existence of Hazor as an occupied and functioning city in the last quarter of the 15th century BC, immediately after the reign of Amenhotep II. Due to the subsequent occupational gap after the destruction of Late-Bronze-I Hazor, which was discussed above, the city could not have been occupied during the modest reign of Thutmose IV if Amenhotep II truly had destroyed the city. Therefore, Amenhotep II’s “destruction” of the city was immediately followed by continuous occupation.Epigraphically, one piece of evidence that argues conclusively against the destruction of Hazor under Amenhotep II is Papyrus Hermitage 1116A, which contains a list recording the allocation of beer and corn to messengers from Djahy, who are envoys to cities such as Megiddo, Chinnereth, Achshaph, Shimron, Taanach, Ashkelon, and Hazor. This list, which demonstrates the trading relations between these southern Canaanite towns and the Egyptian government, is variously dated to the reign of Thutmose III, to the coregency he shared with his son, and to the sole reign of Amenhotep II.[80] However, dating the papyrus to the reign of Thutmose III can be eliminated from the realm of possibility,[81] given that the manuscript is attributed to a regnal Year 18 and bears the praenomen of Amenhotep II—the sign that provides the pharaonic throne-name, and is given to the Egyptian monarch upon his ascension to the throne—enclosed in a royal cartouche.



As Redford concludes,A date for the two Leningrad
papyri shortly after eighteenth year would satisfy all the evidence. But there is no reason to believe that Thutmose III was still alive and reigning at the time.”[82] Given that Hazor was one of the thriving cities involved in the trading of commodities at this time, it had remained unharmed at least into the 18th year of Amenhotep's reign, coinciding to 9 years after the Israelite exodus.Because Amenhotep II’s Year 18 (ca. 1438/1437 BC) was a time when Hazor thrived, it must be emphasized that he launched only two campaigns into Asia: the first in Year 3, and the second in Year 9.[83] This grossly diminished number of Asiatic campaigns is especially startling given that the Egyptian empire was at its height during the reigns of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II.[84] Immediately after these were waged, a sharp decline in the Asiatic campaigning of the pharaohs transpired. Aharoni attributes this to an underlying diminishment of Egyptian power: “Already in the days of Amenhotep II, the son of Thutmose III, cracks began to appear in the structure of the Egyptian Empire.”[85] Vandersleyen hints at the dissipation of Egypt’s might by the end of Amenhotep II’s reign when noting that it seems possible to consider this reign as unsuccessful, a time of decline: a few exploits abroad, a few preserved memorials, an almost complete absence of sources after the ninth year of the reign.[86] Vandersleyen also points out that this relative military inertness lasted continuously until Horemheb came to power, an event that dates to ca. 1335 BC.[87] Since Amenhotep II launched no Asiatic campaigns after his Year 9, Hazor could not have been a functioning city during his Year 18 if he actually destroyed the city, as the long occupational gap rules this out. Thus his “conquest” of Hazor was of the same nature as that of his father, Thutmose III: a capture and subjugation, with no actual destruction of the city.VI. JOSHUA AS THE DESTROYER OF THE LATE BRONZE I CITYIf Thutmose III is not a legitimate choice for the conqueror of the Hazor of Joshua’s day, then what viable options remain? What ancient people, apart from the Egyptians, may have destroyed Hazor? The clear answer is that during this era of Egyptian domination, over both Palestine and a vast portion of the ANE, probably no nation or city-state would have been bold enough to attack and thoroughly destroy this vital pawn in Egypt’s hegemony in Canaan. Amarna Letter (EA) 109 offers an important insight into Egypt’s influence in Canaan during the era that preceded the Amarna Age: “Previously, on seeing a man from Egypt, the kings of Canaan fled bef[ore him, but] now the sons of Abdi-Ashirta make men from Egypt prowl about [like do]gs.”[88]Certainly no Canaanite ruler—and probably no neighbor of Egyptian Palestine, for that matter—would have dared to launch a destructive attack on powerful Hazor during Late Bronze I. Can a case be made for Joshua and the Israelites as candidates on the exceedingly short list of potential destroyers? To date, there is no archaeological evidence to link the Israelites with this destruction conclusively. Yet the city-wide destruction and conflagration attested by the remains of the Late Bronze I city coincide perfectly with the account given in Josh 11:10–11, where Joshua seized control of Hazor, killed the king and all of the inhabitants, and burned the city with fire. Moreover, the violent destruction of the temples provides strong corroborative evidence.In actuality, several other clues exist to substantiate that Joshua absolutely is a plausible choice for the destroyer of the Hazor of the Late Bronze I Age. The first clue is the uncommonly large occupational gap from the end of Late Bronze I to the beginning of Late Bronze II, which Yadin reported from his findings in the lower city and Ben-Tor reported from his findings on the tel. Being that the present writer was part of Hazor’s excavation team of 2007, he can confirm that the occupational gap uncovered learn french

first victorious campaign,” is used correctly on the Amada,

Elephantine, and Memphis Stelae. The earlier “first victorious campaign” occurred in Year 3, during the coregency, while the latter transpired in Year 7, on his first military excursion as an independent monarch. To accent his own achievement, Amenhotep II simply restarted his numbering once he stepped out of his father’s shadow.96 Yet once again, no precedent exists for pharaohs dating their military campaigns separately: first as a coregent, then as a sole ruler. This theory would be far more tenable if an inscription were found that dubbed the initial campaign described on the Memphis Stele as “the first victorious campaign of Amenhotep II’s sole rule.” Moreover, a crippling weakness is that Amenhotep II launched his Year-3 campaign as a sole ruler, in response to the Syro-Palestinian revolt waged after his father’s death.By way of evaluation, insurmountable obstacles plague both versions of the three-campaign theory, thus rendering this option insufficient and unacceptable. The greatest problem is the lack of precedent for any such dual numbering of military campaigns by New-Kingdom pharaohs. Redford rightly notes, “[T]hat two separate systems of year-numbering were employed by Amenophis (II) is without other foundation and is a priori unlikely.”97 Moreover, a comparison of lines 2–3 on the Memphis Stele with lines 16–19 on the Amada Stele— both of which describe his “first victorious campaign”—reveals some strong similarities, particularly in the choice of words and the parallel actions depicted, so all of the various “first campaigns” of Amenhotep II surely refer to a singular Asiatic campaign.98e. The Theory of Two Asiatic Campaigns.The inadequacies of the three-campaign theory have caused many scholars to propose that Amenhotep II launched only two Asiatic campaigns, despite the victory stelae attributing campaigns to Years 3, 7, and 9. This theory also has two variations. (1) The Year-3 campaign is synonymous with the Year-7 campaign due to differing regnal counting systems. Its proponents assert that the Amada and Elephantine Stelae record the same campaign as the Memphis Stele’s first campaign, but with the stipulation that the latter stele counts regnal years from the beginning of the coregency, while the former stelae count them from the outset of the sole rule. As Pritchard calculates, “A possible reconciliation would be that the 7th year after the coregency began was the 3rd year of the sole reign.”99 One problem with this variation is the lack of precedent for dating pharaonic regnal years using two different methods: sometimes coregent numbering, and other times sole-regent numbering. Another problem is that the coregency now is known to have lasted exactly 2 1/3 years, making it mathematically impossible to equate the two campaigns, since the coregency would have to have lasted for a minimum of three years and one day for Pritchard to be correct.(2) The Year-3 campaign is synonymous with the Year-7 campaign due to an inaccurate date displayed on the Memphis Stele. This version also assumes that the first campaign on the Karnak Stele, the campaigns described on the Elephantine and Amada Stelae, and the first campaign on the Memphis Stele, all refer to the same event. However, it purports that the Amada and Elephantine Stelae correctly date the “first victorious campaign” to Year 3, while the Memphis Stele displays a wrongly-reconstructed date etched onto it by a 19th Dynasty stelae-restoration crew that attempted to repair the damage it suffered during the Amarna Age. Vandersleyen observes that “the Memphis date is on the part of the memorial that was seriously damaged in the Amarna Age; the date that we read today is the result of Rameside restoration.”100 He concludes, “Thus the initial date of Year 7 on the Memphis Stele is a[n inaccurate] restoration made by the Ramesides.”101f. Conclusion for the Number of Asiatic Campaigns.Both variations of the three-campaign theory proved to be weak and indefensible. Vandersleyen perceptively notes, “The simplest and most logical solution is that there was only one ‘first campaign,’ . . . more plausibly in Year 3 than in Year 7.”102 Therefore, based on the strong likelihood of a singular error on the Memphis Stele—due to inaccurate restoration by Ramesside craftsmen—as the best explanation to harmonize the conflicting evidence on the stelae, the two-campaign theory is preferred. The Elephantine Stele, whose events are set in Takhsi,103 even provides a terminus ad quem for the first campaign, as line 26 dates the stele to Year 4. “It is only reasonable to conclude that the events including the Takhsi campaign recounted in the text before this postscript are earlier than Year 4. Thus there is no reason to deny the clear implication of the text that the expedition against Takhsi transpired before [the end of] Year 3.”104 Also supporting the view that the Memphis Stele’s first campaign was waged in Year 3, and not in Year 7, is the evidence from Amenhotep II’s cupbearer. During Year 4, the cupbearer Minmès remarks that a stele was built for pharaoh in Naharin, located to the east of the Euphrates River, the inscription of which confirms that the first Asiatic campaign occurred before Year 4 ended.1054. The First Asiatic Campaign of Amenhotep II.For the sake of brevity, Amenhotep II’s first campaign will be referred to as A1, while his second campaign will be called A2. As was proven already, he launched A1 in Year 3, and the events surrounding this campaign can be dated chronologically in the following sequence: (1) Thutmose III died on ca. 22 March 1452 BC; (2) Amenhotep II presided over the funeral and was confirmed as sole ruler; (3) the Syro-Palestinian city-states rebelled after hearing of Thutmose III’s death; (4) Amenhotep II assembled his army from throughout Egypt and the nearby garrisoned cities; and (5) Amenhotep II launched A1, arriving at his first destination on ca. 15 May 1452 BC.The death of Thutmose III led to a massive revolt in his Syro-Palestinian territories, which propelled the launching of A1.106 Amenhotep II officiated at his father’s funeral as the “new Horus,” as Thutmose III was buried on the west bank of the Nile River at Waset, in his elevated, cliff-cut “mansion of eternity.”107 His presence at the funeral, combined with the nearly two-month gap between his father’s death and the army’s arrival at their first destination, dispels the notion that he was already engaged in A1 when his father died. The energetic son of Egypt’s greatest imperialist wasted no time, as he probably left Egypt in April of ca. 1452 BC, just as his father had done on his first Asiatic campaign, exactly 32 years prior. The undisputed epicenter of the rebellion was the coastal cities of Syria, the focal point of the discussion in The Annals of Amenhotep II. Undoubtedly, the coastal cities of Syria—and perhaps Palestine, as well—had rebelled, and hence the young pharaoh was forced to proceed by land in order to quell this revolt.1085. The Second Asiatic Campaign of Amenhotep II.Amenhotep II indisputably launched A2 in Year 9. If his reign began in ca. 1455 BC, which harmonizes with the Ebers Papyrus and the regnal lengths of the intervening pharaohs, his ninth year lasted from ca. 22 November 1447 – 22 November 1446 BC. Therefore, the exodus date of ca. 25 April 1446 BC should be placed within this particular regnal year, unless the Year-9 reading on the Memphis Stele is ever proven to be an inaccurate reconstruction also. Ancient sources and modern commentators both expend far less energy writing about A2 than they do about A1. Clearly A1 was launched to squelch a rebellion, but why did Amenhotep II embark on a second trip into Asia six years later? Two principal theories have been proposed to identify the occasion.a. The Second Asiatic Campaign Launched to Finish the Task of the First Campaign.The first theory for the motive of A2 is that it was launched to correct the shortcomings of A1.



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may be inferred by Amenhotep II’s setting out two years later on a second campaign in order to put down revolts in the Sharon and in the Jezreel

t simply a brief raid into southern Palestine that accomplished little more than the acquisition of slaves and booty.b. The Second Asiatic Campaign Launched to Replenish Egypt after Their Losses.The second theory for the motive of A2 is that it was launched to replenish the Egyptian slave base and many of the valuable commodities that were lost when the Israelites plundered and fled Egypt. According to this theory, pharaoh’s motive is related to the exodus. If the exodus and Amenhotep II’s Year-9 campaign transpired in the same year, which is highly possible given the chronological harmonization demonstrated earlier, a brief campaign into southern Palestine to recover some of his critical losses would be both logical and expected. The feasibility of this theory will be determined by a study of the details related to A2.6. The Unique, Pre-Winter Launching of the Second Asiatic Campaign.The date of Year 9, Month 3, Season 1, Day 25 (or ca. 16 November 1446 BC) recorded on the Memphis Stele represents either the Egyptian army’s launching date from Memphis or the arrival date at their first destination, though more likely the latter. Either way, in antiquity a November date represents an extremely odd time for a military campaign. “The present date would fall in the early part of November, an unusual season for an Egyptian campaign in Asia.”111 The reason for November being an unusual launch-time is that the campaign would be fought throughout the cold, rainy winter, when ancient monarchs typically remained within their borders, dealt with internal affairs, and planned for springtime military campaigns.112 The Biblical text confirms the normalcy of springtime launchings: “Then it happened in the spring, at the time when kings go out to battle, that Joab led out the army and ravaged the land of the sons of Ammon, and he came and besieged Rabbah” (1 Chr 20:1).Der Manuelian comments on A1, “Hardly one to break with the blossoming military tradition of the early New Kingdom, Amenophis set out in April of his seventh year, the preferred season for embarking on such ventures.”113 Vandersleyen contrasts this with the unprecedented timing of A2: “The second Asiatic campaign began on the 25th day of the 3rd month (akhet) of the 9th year, during an unusual season for military campaigns. It was probably induced by the necessity of urgent intervention.”114 Amenhotep II’s decision to lead an attack force into Palestine in November was extremely unorthodox, so obviously the situation did require urgent Egyptian intervention, which Vandersleyen perceptively notes. But in what did Amenhotep II need to intervene? Unlike A1, which was launched to quell a rebellion, A2 had no obvious occasion.7. The Contrast between the Two Asiatic Campaigns Launched by Amenhotep II.Marked differences exist between A1 and A2. The names of the geographical sites on A1 are mostly unknown, and those that are considered known are too far apart to belong to one region. In contrast, the sites mentioned on A2 are located only in Central Palestine, between Aphek and Anaharath. When comparing the courses of both campaigns, the disproportionate nature of the two routes is striking, as the locations on A1 are distant and scattered, while the sites on A2 are nearby and closely positioned in relation to one another.115 Moreover, every early campaign of Thutmose III through his illustrious eighth campaign into Mesopotamia, which represents the maximum extent of Egypt’s expansionism, pushed further into foreign territory. In contrast, A1 and A2 followed exactly the opposite trend, going from an itinerary further away from to closer to Egypt.8. The Drastic Change in Foreign-Policy after the Second Asiatic Campaign of Amenhotep II.Another oddity of A2 is that after its conclusion, the Egyptian army—established by Thutmose III as the 15th century BC’s most elite fighting force—went into virtual hibernation. Their previous policy of unwavering aggressiveness toward Mitanni became one of passivity and the signing of peace treaties. The reason for this new policy is missing from the historical record, but Amenhotep II evidently was the pharaoh who first signed a treaty with Mitanni, subsequent to A2.116 Redford connects this event to “the arrival (after year 10, we may be sure) of a Mitannian embassy sent by [Mitanni’s King] Saussatar with proposals of ‘brotherhood’ (i.e., a fraternal alliance and renunciation of hostilities).”117 Redford adds that “Amenophis II seemed susceptible to negotiations,” and that he “was apparently charmed and disarmed by the embassy from ‘Naharin,’ and perhaps even signed a treaty.”118 Yet such a treaty is completely out of character for imperial Egypt and this prideful monarch, especially since “the pharaonic state of the Eighteenth Dynasty could, more easily than Mitanni, sustain the expense of periodic military incursions 800 km into Asia.”119 Support for Amenhotep II being the first to sign a pact with Mitanni is found in the actions of Thutmose IV: “Only by postulating a change of reign can we explain a situation in which the new pharaoh, Thutmose IV, can feel free to attack Mitannian holdings with impunity.”120 Why would Amenhotep II do the unthinkable, and opt to make a treaty with Mitanni?This mysterious reversal in foreign policy would remain unexplainable and unthinkable if not for the possibility of a single, cataclysmic event. If the Egyptians lost virtually their entire army in the springtime disaster at the Red Sea in Year 9, a desperate reconnaissance campaign designed to “save face” with the rest of the ancient world and to replenish their Israelite slave-base would be paramount. Certainly the Egyptians would have needed time to rally their remaining forces together, however small and/or in shambles their army may have been, and it would explain a November campaign that was nothing more than a slave-raid into Palestine as a show of force. The Egyptians could not afford to live through the winter without the production that was provided by the Hebrew workforce, and they could not allow Mitanni or any other ancient power to consider using the winter to plan an attack on Egyptian territories, which would seem vulnerable. If this scenario represents what actually transpired in ANE history, however, tangible proof is needed to verify its veracity.VII. THE LOSS OF THE EGYPTIAN SLAVE-BASEAccording to Num 1:45–46, the Israelites’ post-exodus, male population over 20 years old totaled 603,550, which does not include the 22,000 Levite males of Num 3:39. When women and children are added, they well would have exceeded 2,000,000 people.121 A populace of this magnitude must have provided the backbone of the Egyptian slave-force, given both their vast numbers and rigorous labors (Exod 1:11–14). To most Egyptology students, however, the exodus-narrative is considered little more than a fanciful folktale designed to impress Jewish children with grand illusions of a glorious, ethnic past. The virtual absence of historical and archaeological evidence to verify the Israelite



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